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Jury tampering by another name?
By EPHRAIM MARGOLIN
and GERALD F. UELMEN
1rowing use of anony-
mous juries in criminal
trials presents a chal-
lenge to the fundamen-
, tal values protected by
the defendant's right to
a jury trial: the presumption of in-
nocence, and the requirement of
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. It is important to understand
the extent to which these fragile
rights are burdened by jury anonym-
ity so that effective safeguards can be
developed.
Juror anonymity is an innovation
that was unknown to the common
law and to American jurisprudence
in its first two centuries. Anonymity
was first employed in federal prose-
cutions of organized crime in New
York in the 1980s. Its use has spread
more recently to widely publicized
and volatile cases such as the federal
prosecution of police officers ac-
cused of beating Rodney King; the
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trial of African American defendants
alleged to have beaten Reginald
Denny, a white truck driver, during
the riots after the first Rodney King
verdict; and the trial of those accused
of the fatal World Trade Center
bombing in New York City.
In some of these cases, the defense
offered no objection to use of an
anonymous jury. This judgment,
however, demands careful weighing
of anonymity's potentially harmful
impact on the defendant. The deci-
sion can be described as a "tactical
judgment" only where the court al-
lows open-ended voir dire suffi-
ciently meaningful to permit an in-
formed judgment call. Most often,
the defense operates in a fog, and
preservation of anonymity posttrial
makes assessment of the process im-
possible.
Available evidence suggests that
anonymity may impose substantial
burdens on a jury's deliberative pro-
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cess. Nevertheless, courts have al-
lowed prosecutors to use this radical
innovation as a tactical ploy-de-
spite the potentially increased
chances of conviction-without bal-
ancing the frequently unproven as-
sertions of the prosecution against
the probability of harm for the de-
fense and without requiring careful
monitoring and cautious scrutiny of
the process. A shroud of secrecy pre-
cludes any accumulation of data to
assess the impact of anonymity.
The showing necessary to justify
anonymity can be made routinely in
any case to which a prosecutor af-
fixes an "organized crime" or "ter-
rorism" label and attributes allega-
tions of prior jury tampering to the
defendant by virtue of his or her
alleged control over "organized
crime" or "terrorist" affiliates.
There is an eerie parallel between
attempts in Northern Ireland to re-
strict the right to a jury trial in cases
where terrorist crimes are alleged
and American use of juror anonym-
ity in cases to which the "organized
crime" or "terrorism" label is ap-
plied. In both situations, the label be-
comes a self-fulfilling prophecy, di-
minishing the procedural protections
available to the accused before the
label's accuracy has been deter-
mined.
An American tradition
The public nature of the jury trial
has been recognized since its in-
ception. As the Supreme Court noted
in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court of California, 464 U.S. 501,
505 (1984):
The roots of open trials reach
back to the days before the Nor-
man Conquest when cases in Eng-
land were brought before ... a
town meeting kind of body ....
15 M
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Attendance was virtually compul-
sory on the part of the freemen of
the community ....
Although the Supreme Court in
Press-Enterprise did not rely explic-
itly on the Sixth Amendment right to
a "speedy and public trial," the
Court nonetheless stated that there
has always been a "presumptive
openness of the jury selection pro-
cess" and that "how we allocate the
'right' to openness as between the
accused and the public, or whether
we view it as a component inherent
in the system benefiting both, is not
crucial."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, relying on Press-En-
terprise and on the fact that histori-
cally "everybody knew everybody
on the jury," rejected jury anonym-
ity in In re Baltimore Sun, 841 F.2d
74, 76-77 (4th Cir. 1988):
We think it no more than appli-
cation of what has always been
the law to require a district court
... to release the names and ad-
dresses of those jurors who are sit-
ting .... We recognize the diffi-
culties which may exist in highly
publicized trials ... and the pres-
sures upon jurors. But we think
the risk of loss of confidence in
the judicial process is too great to
permit a criminal defendant to be
tried by a jury whose members
may maintain anonymity. If...
the attendant dangers of a highly
publicized trial are too great, [the
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court] may always sequester the
jury and change of venue is al-
ways possible ....
The Fourth Circuit is not alone in
having reached this conclusion. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts recently reversed an orga-
nized crime defendant's conviction
for being an accessory to first-degree
murder on the ground that he was
deprived of his right to know the
prospective jurors' names and ad-
dresses. (Commonwealth v. Angiulo,
415 Mass. 502 (1993).) Although the
ruling was based on a statutory right
to a jury list in capital cases (Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 277, § 66 (West
1990)), the court noted the common
law origin of the requirement and
the constitutional limitations on the
use of anonymous juries even in
noncapital cases.
A two-hundred-year-old federal
statute requires the prosecution to
furnish any defendant charged with
a capital offense with "a list of the
veniremen ... stating the place of
abode of each venireman" at least
three full days before the com-
mencement of trial. (18 USC § 3432
(Supp. 1992).) One century ago, the
U.S. Supreme Court declared that
compliance with the statute's provi-
sions is mandatory, even when the
defendant is acquitted of a capital
charge and convicted of a lesser of-
fense. (Logan v. United States, 144
U.S. 263 (1892).)
More recent cases have declared
that the right arises from the nature
of the charges, even if the prosecu-
tion does not intend to seek the
death penalty, and that failure to
comply with the statutory require-
ment is "plain error." (Amsler v.
United States, 381 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.
1967); United States v. Crowell, 442
F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1971).) Thus, the
empanelment of an anonymous jury
is precluded in capital cases in fed-
eral court.
The primary justification for using
an anonymous jury is to foreclose
any opportunity for jury tampering
by the defendant or the defendant's
associates. The motivation for and
risk of such behavior is at its height
in capital cases, yet Congress has
determined that alternatives other
than anonymity must be employed
to protect the jurors' safety and their
deliberations in such cases.
The 1990 restoration of a federal
death penalty creates a serious
anomaly in cases that permit use of
anonymous juries. Jurors' identities
may be kept from an "organized
crime" defendant accused of drug
trafficking but not from a defendant
accused of murdering a police offi-
cer who sought to arrest the defen-
dant for drug trafficking.
Organized crime
The anonymous jury has become
a hallmark of organized crime cases.
In recent years, it has been trans-
formed from a rare and unusual
"last resort" into a standard tactical
weapon in the prosecutorial quiver.
The obvious effect of its employ-
ment was noted by John Markham,
a former federal prosecutor: "[An
anonymous jury] ominously signals
the jurors that you are so dangerous
that you cannot even be trusted with
their names." (2(8) California State
Bar Bull. 1 (June 1992).)
The prejudice that a defendant
suffers when tried by an anonymous
jury is not unlike the prejudice suf-
fered by a defendant who is gagged
and shackled in the courtroom. The
cases upholding the use of court-
room restraints in the presence of a
jury make it clear that the defen-
dant's own personal courtroom con-
duct is the only trigger that can jus-
tify this burden on his or her rights.
In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970), the Court conceded that the
sight of shackles and a gag might
have a significant effect on the jury's
attitude toward the defendant, but it
upheld the practice to control a dis-
ruptive defendant. As the Court later
explained in Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 505 n.2 (1976): "The con-
tumacious defendant brings this
plight upon himself and presents the
court with a limited range of alter-
natives. Obviously, a defendant
cannot be allowed to abort a trial
and frustrate the process of justice
by his own acts."
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Personal accountability for any
danger to the jury should similarly
be the linchpin to justify juror ano-
nymity in any case, whether or not
an "organized crime" connection
can be made. As the court stated in
United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236,
241 (2d Cir. 1991):
The invocation of the words "or-
ganized crime," "mob," or "Ma-
fia," unless there is something
more, does not warrant an anon-
ymous jury. This "something
more" can be a demonstrable his-
tory or likelihood of obstruction of
justice on the part of the defen-
dant or others acting on his behalf
or a showing that trial evidence
will depict a pattern of violence
by the defendants and his associ-
ates such as would cause a juror
to reasonably fear for his own
safety.
Terrorism
There is a strong parallel between
the use of anonymous juries in or-
ganized crime cases and their use in
cases involving terrorism. The stated
concern is to protect jurors from in-
terference or retaliation by those
who may be affiliated with the de-
fendants.
Similar concerns, however, led to
the complete abrogation of the right
to a jury trial in Northern Ireland for
those accused of terrorist activity.
Under the Northern Ireland (Emer-
gency Provisions) Act of 1973,
"Diplock" courts were established
to try such defendants without a
jury. The fairness of Diplock courts
has been called into question. Some
have attributed the reduced acquit-
tal rate to "case hardened" judges
who hear a regular procession of
cases alleging terrorism and to the
frequency with which judges decide
both the admissibility of confessions
and the guilt or innocence of the de-
fendant in the same case.
A proposal to restore the right to a
jury trial in terrorist cases in
Northern Ireland included a recom-
mendation that jurors remain anon-
ymous. It suggested that jurors could
be transported to court in buses and
concealed from public view behind
a curtain or screen; neither defense
nor prosecution lawyers would be
given jurors' names or addresses.
In rejecting this proposal, the
Standing Advisory Commission on
Human Rights (a public body in
Northern Ireland established to ad-
vise the government on criminal jus-
tice and human rights matters) con-
cluded that it probably would be
impossible to maintain anonymity
during a lengthy trial. In addition,
the commission felt that "it is impor-
tant in any trial by jury for the defen-
dant to be able to object to some
members of the jury panel; this right
could not be properly exercised
without some information as to thejurors' identity."
Ironically, the commission con-
cluded that no jury trial at all was
preferable to using an anonymous
jury. This conclusion underscores
the uncertainty surrounding ano-
nymity's effect on jury selection and
deliberations. To what extent can a
defendant's historical right to a jury
trial be compromised before total
elimination of the use of a jury be-
comes a preferable alternative?
Corrective jury instructions
The potential burden of jury ano-
nymity on the defendant's presump-
tion of innocence was conceded in
United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d
1359 (2d Cir. 1985). It was even rec-
ognized that the prejudicial impact
on the defendant could not be elim-
inated totally.
In rejecting a per se rule against
anonymity, the Thomas court under-
lined two essential prerequisites for
use of an anonymous jury. First,
there should be "strong reason to
believe the jury needs protection,"
and second, reasonable precaution
must be taken to minimize the neg-
ative effect of use of the anonymousjury "on the jurors' opinions of the
defendants."
Unfortunately, the court also en-
dorsed concealing from the jury the
real reason for anonymity. The prin-
cipal justification offered for ano-
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nymity was to prevent jury tamper-
ing, but the court approved an
instruction that deliberately made
no mention of that, only of the ne-
cessity to protect jurors from "un-
wanted and undesirable publicity
and embarrassment and notoriety
and any access to you which would
interfere with preserving your sworn
duty to fairly, impartially and inde-
pendently serve as jurors."
Cases following Thomas have car-
ried this skewing of motivation to
even greater heights. In United
States v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3d
Cir. 1988), the court justified ano-
nymity because evidence describing
the defendant's organized crime
connection might have led jurors to
fear for their safety and that of their
families. At the same time, the court
approved a jury instruction as fol-
lows:
I want to emphasize very strongly
that this in no way suggests that
the defendant would ever have
dreamed of interfering with you or
your family. I have been a judge
now for 27 years, and in all that
time I have never heard of a case
where any defendant ever tried to
cause harm to a juror or a mem-
ber of the juror's family.
The judge's recollection was ac-
curate: Physical injury to a juror has
been traced to a defendant in only
one case, United States v. Bentvena,
319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963). It is
nonetheless unrealistic to expect
that jurors will avert their natural
suspicion from the most obvious
source of danger in the courtroom
based on this admonishment.
Juries are well aware of the fact
that anonymity is reserved for cases
involving threats to their safety, and
such threats are frequently attributed
to "organized crime" defendants.
As Judge Robert Gardner put it, "Ajuror is not some kind of dithering
nincompoop, brought in from
never-never land and exposed to the
harsh realities of life for the first time
in the jury box." (People v. Long, 38
Cal. App. 3d 687, 689 (1974).)
The Scarfo court conceded that a
corrective instruction is a "subter-
fuge which conceal[s] the actual
17M
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reason for preserving anonymity."
But it went on to say that "juries are
not fooled by such subterfuge, and
are actually more likely to draw
prejudicial inferences about defen-
dants from speculation as to the rea-
sons for their anonymity than from
actual knowledge of those reasons."
Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Uni-
versity has said more bluntly that
"lying to the jury is contagious and
does not fool anyone. Judges who
lie to juries undermine the system of
justice more than does any fear of
possible jury tampering." (Nat'l L. J.
at 22, col. 4 (Nov. 2, 1987).)
Nothing corrodes the criminal
justice system more than routine ju-
dicial sanctioning of jury instruc-
tions that the judges themselves
have no evidence to support. Sani-
tized instructions to the jury cannot
disguise the fact that anonymity is
predicated on the real risk of jury
tampering. It must be assumed that
jurors recognize this risk and that it
will ultimately affect their attitude
toward the defendant and their de-
liberations regarding guilt or inno-
cence.
Tell jurors the truth: There was ev-
idence of jury tampering in some
other organized crime cases and,
while neither the attorney nor the
defendant involved in those cases is
the same as those involved in the
present case, precautions are being
taken to ensure the jurors' protec-
tion. Less harm will be done than if
the jury is presented with false con-
cerns about the media and left to
speculate as to the horrendous
crimes the defendant might have,
but in fact had not, committed.
Sequestration
Concerns that trial publicity might
enhance the possibility of juror ha-
rassment can ordinarily be dealt
with by means short of an anony-
mous jury. Sequestration of jurors,
for example, may be justified, but
sequestration and anonymity need
not go hand in hand. If the real con-
cern is to "ward off curiosity" and
shelter the jurors from interference
with performing their sworn duty,
sequestration itself accomplishes
these goals. Anonymity adds noth-
ing.
Some prosecutors argue that se-
questration will not protect a juror's
family from threats. This argument
has no factual predicate, because
there simply is no recorded example
of such threats ever being commu-
nicated to the family of a seques-
tered juror. Nonetheless, such con-
jecture will sound plausible in any
case where a risk of jury tampering
is held to be likely because of the
defendant's alleged organized crime
or terrorist affiliations.
To protect jurors from the impor-
tunate media even after their jury
service is concluded, courts can
fashion protective orders that pro-
hibit repeated interview requests
and questioning about statements
made by jurors other than the juror
who has agreed to an interview. (See
United States v. Antar, 839 F. Supp.
293 (D. N.J. 1993); Abraham S.
Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Me-
dia: The Problems of Postverdict In-
terviews, U. Ill. L. Rev. 295 (1993).)
Notably, sequestration adds sub-
stantially to the aura of fear created
by the use of an anonymous jury. It
increases the risk that jurors will at-
tribute the burdens imposed on
them to threats made by the defen-
dant. Courts must guard against an
"ostensible display of unusual pre-
caution which might have been in-
terpreted as singling out the defen-
dants as ... particularly dangerous
or guilty persons." (Hardee v. Kuhl-
man, 581 F.2d 330, 332 (2d Cir.
1978).)
In the federal trial of John Gotti,
the order of sequestration imposed a
security regimen on the jurors com-
parable to incarceration in Marion
Federal Prison. Marshals were or-
dered to accompany jurors on visits
to church, doctors' offices, barber or
beauty shops, and stores. They mon-
itored all telephone conversations
between jurors and family members
and censored all incoming mail.
Even visits by jurors with their
spouse or children were monitored
by marshals.
Standard 19 of the American Bar
Association Standards Relating to Ju-
ror Use and Management notes the
risks of sequestration: reduced rep-
resentativeness of the panel, an al-
tered deliberative process, and ju-
rors' resentment. This last risk, the
standards emphasize, means that
"neither the judge nor counsel
should disclose to the jury which
party requested sequestration."
Where anonymity accompanies se-
questration, it will of course be ob-
vious to the jury who made seques-
tration necessary.
Juries were not sequestered in at
least two Second Circuit cases em-
ploying anonymous juries where
there was a substantial showing of
risk of jury tampering. In United
States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843 (2d
Cir. 1985), marshals drove the jurors
home at night. In United States v.
Persico, 832 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1987), marshals simply transported
jurors to an undisclosed central lo-
cation from which they departed for
home.
Unlike anonymity, sequestration
by itself can be explained plausibly
to jurors as necessary to protect
them from the media-from both
improper attempts to contact them
and accidental exposure to prejudi-
cial news reports. That explanation
is seriously undercut, however,
when sequestration is accompanied
by anonymity.
When the need to protect jurors
from overly persistent media is ob-
vious, a defendant may believe that
an anonymous jury clearly is a pref-
erable alternative to sequestration
and that jurors will not assume the
anonymity suggests that the defen-
dant poses some danger to them.
This apparently was the conclusion
reached by the police officer defen-
dants in the second Rodney King
trial, given that the defense offered
no objection to the use of an anon-
ymous jury.
The circumstances under which a
defendant would be willing to waive
his or her right to learn the identities
of the jurors are quite limited, how-
ever. Even when circumstances are
right, the defense may want to sug-
gest a compromise in which the ju-
rors' identities are given only to the
(Continued on page 60)
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been formally charged. The police
are under no Fifth Amendment duty
either to let the lawyer communi-
cate with Desperado or to inform
the suspect of the lawyer's presence.
Indeed, police may even stall in
order to gain a tactical advantage,
although this practice is not
encouraged.
Under the Sixth Amendment,
Desperado is not entitled to see
counsel-without first requesting
counsel-before he is formally
charged. (Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412 (1986); Mitchell v. State,
816 S.W.2d 566 (Ark. 1991).) A ca-
veat: Some states will suppress con-
fessions when police refuse to
cooperate with counsel under the
foregoing scenario. (People v. John-
son, 570 N.E.2d 400 (111. App. 3d
Dist. 1991).)
A Miranda meltdown?
The Miranda rules are complex.
Ironically, the Supreme Court's in-
tent in promulgating the rules was to
clarify judicial review guidelines. As
the court recently commented:
[T]he police do not need our as-
sistance to establish ... [interro-
gation guidelines]; they are free, if
they wish, to adopt [guidelines]
on their own. Of course it is our
task to establish guidelines for ju-
Anonymous Jury
(Continued from page 18)
participating attorneys and not dis-
closed to the public or even to the
defendants.
Application of a standard that
equates and combines anonymity
and sequestration poses grave risks
to defendants. The courts should de-
lineate clearly when sequestration is
appropriate, when anonymity may
be employed, and in what limited
circumstances anonymity and se-
questration may be combined.
Being an anonymous juror
Unquestionably, with the increas-
ing use of anonymous juries, the
dicial review. We like them to be
"clear and unequivocal," 
. . . but
only when they guide sensibly,
and in a direction we are autho-
rized to go.
(McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. at
2211 (emphasis in original; citation
omitted).)
There clearly are a multitude of
ways that the police and prosecutors
may bend the rules. Given the Su-
preme Court's desire for sensible di-
rectives, is Miranda headed for a
meltdown? Before long, the sole
clear and unequivocal judge-made
guideline may revolve around the
good faith of the police interrogator
and the voluntariness of the suspect.
This prognostication is not baseless.
In Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166, the
court arguably foreshadowed the
application of good faith analysis to
interrogations and confessions by
citing to a prior good faith exception
case (albeit in the search warrant
context) and pointing out that the
purpose of the Miranda exclusion-
ary rule is to deter law enforcement
misconduct.
It is even possible that 18 USC
§ 3501 (enacted as Title II of the
Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime
Control Act, 82 Stat. 197 (1968))
overrules Miranda, at least in federal
court. (See U.S. v. Alvarez-Sanchez,
128 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1994), holding
that § 3501 applies only to persons
charged with federal crimes.) The
statute appears to mandate that only
involuntary confessions shall be ex-
cluded. Thus, the argument goes,
Congress's intent is that voluntary
statements obtained in technical vi-
olation of Miranda are admissible.
(See, e.g., Justice Antonin Scalia's
concurring opinion in Davis, 55
Crim. L. Rptr at 2209-10, lamenting
the government's failure to raise the
argument; U.S. v. Robinson, 439
F.2d 553, 574 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(McGowen, J., dissenting).)
Few commentators expected the
Supreme Court's adoption of the
"threshold" standard in Davis.
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and
Antonin Scalia seem interested in
the apparent conflict between Mir-
anda and § 3501. (See oral argu-
ment summary in Davis, 55 Crim. L.
Rptr 3011 (1994).) Thus, the Su-
preme Court appears poised to re-
treat from the rigidity and confusion
of the Miranda rules.
Given that the American public
today is as familiar with the Miranda
warnings as with the pledge of alle-
giance, the time has come to return
to a voluntariness test-a test which,
as espoused in § 3501, takes into
consideration the suspect's knowl-
edge of his or her "rights" but does
not render this knowledge (or lack
thereof) conclusive on the issue of
voluntariness or admissibility. C
I-_-- '+++ L t 4t,
courts are engaged in a "grand ex-
periment" with the traditional safe-
guards of the American right to jury
trial. A true experiment, however,
requires careful measurement and
assessment of this new variable's
impact on jury selection and delib-
eration. Ironically, the very protec-
tion provided by anonymity fore-
closes access to the most accurate
means of assessing the experiment's
outcome: postverdict debriefing of
the jurors themselves.
First impressions. The research of
social psychologists and others who
have studied jurors' behavior
strongly suggests that anonymity
poses grave risks to some of the fun-
damental values that underlie trial
by jury. Research confirms the pow-
erful influence of each juror's first
impression of a defendant and the
impact that the array of first opinions
has on the jury's subsequent evalua-
tion of evidence and deliberations,
thereby burdening the presumption
of innocence. Jurors holding a mi-
nority view are more easily swayed
toward the impressions held by the
larger faction than vice versa. (Val-
erie P. Hans and Neil Vidmar, Judg-
ing the Jury 110 (Plenum, 1986).)
When the first impression is
strongly negative, jurors may resolve
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close issues of evidentiary dispute,
such as the credibility of witnesses,
much differently than they would
have otherwise. The phenomenon
was noted by Harry Kalven Jr. and
Hans Zeisel in their classic study,
The American Jury 114, 165 (Little,
Brown, 1966):
The jury does not often con-
sciously and explicitly yield to
sentiment in the teeth of the law.
Rather, it yields to sentiment in
the apparent process of resolving
doubts as to evidence. The jury,
therefore, is able to conduct its re-
volt from the law within the eti-
quette of resolving issues of fact.
In an influential simulated jury
study, it was found that characteriz-
ing the defendant as "a notorious
gangster and syndicate boss who
had been vying for power in the
syndicate controlling the state's un-
derworld activities" made a signifi-
cant difference in trial outcome
compared to a case where identical
evidence was presented against a
more sympathetic defendant. (David
Landy and Elliot Aronson, The Influ-
ence of the Character of the Criminal
and His Victim on the Decisions of
Simulated jurors, 5 J. Experimental
Soc. Psychology 141 (1969).)
Another simulation study revealed
that the entire nature of the deliber-
ative process was affected by reveal-
ing a defendant's prior conviction,
even when there was an instruction
to disregard that fact except in as-
sessing the defendant's credibility.
When a prior conviction was
brought to the jurors' attention, they
were more likely to discuss matters
that hurt the defendant's case and
more likely to think that the various
pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution were strong. (Gordon
Bermant, Charlan Nemeth, and Neil
Vidmar, eds., Psychology and the
Law: Research Frontiers 135, 142
(Lexington, 1976).)
Once the seeds of suspicion are
planted by the use of juror anonym-
ity, the jurors may attribute sinister
implications to the defendant's
courtroom appearance and de-
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meanor. In Angiulo, supra, the ju-
rors, who had been impaneled
anonymously, complained during
the trial that the defendant was giv-
ing them the "whammy" or "evil
eye" and was writing down infor-
mation about them. There was no
finding that the defendant attempted
to intimidate jurors by unusual eye
contact.
jury instructions may do more
harm than good. Reliance on jury
instructions to dispel the prejudicial
impression of the defendant created
by anonymity may have a boomer-
ang effect. Numerous experiments
have shown that restrictive instruc-
tions may backfire by magnifying
the influence of the very factors that
jurors were exhorted to ignore.
One such study found that jurors
deliberating in groups and then ren-
dering individual judgments were
harsher in convicting and sentenc-
ing after they were given specific in-
structions to "decide on the dis-
puted facts without regard to [the
unfavorable] non-evidential aspects
of the defendant." (Cheryl J. Oros
and Donald Elman, Impact of Judge's
Instructions upon Jurors' Decisions:
The "Cautionary Charge" in Rape
Trials, 10 Representative Research
in Soc. Psych. 28 (1979).)
Hidden in the crowd. A second
major concern arises from psycho-
logical research on "deindividua-
tion," a phenomenon described by
Philip Zimbardo, a leading professor
of psychology at Stanford Univer-
sity. According to Zimbardo, when
an individual feels increasingly
anonymous under conditions that
serve to minimize self-observation
and, particularly, concern over eval-
uation by others, he or she tends to
behave in ways that reflect a "low-
ered threshold of normally re-
strained behavior." (Monte M. Page,
ed., Nebraska Symposium on Moti-
vation: Personality, Current Theory,
and Research, 240, 251 (Univ. of
Nebraska Press, 1983).)
The impact of this phenomenon
on the deliberations of a jury pro-
duces the precise opposite of the ra-
tional, responsible decision making
we strive for in our American system
of justice:
Virtually by definition, deindivi-
duated behavior must have the
property of being a high intensity
manifestation of behavior which
observers would agree is emo-
tional, impulsive, irrational, re-
gressive, or atypical for the person
in the given situation.
(Id. at 251.)
Creating anonymity in laboratory
experiments on small-group behav-
ior (measuring subjects' willingness
to deliver electric shocks to inno-
cent victims), Zimbardo docu-
mented that "[c]onditions which in-
duce feelings of remoteness lead to
lowered self-consciousness, less em-
barrassment, and reduced inhibi-
tions about punishing the victim."
(Id. at 270.) Thus, by increasing the
risk of emotional, impulsive, and ir-
rational decision making, the "dein-
dividuation" of anonymity may di-
lute the protection provided by




risks to the traditional deliberative
processes of American juries. The re-
search of social psychologists sug-
gests that these risks could include
both an undermining of the presump-
tion of innocence and a dilution of
the proof standard. The combination
of anonymity with sequestration sim-
ply compounds these risks.
The restoration of a federal death
penalty in the face of a two-century-
old statutory requirement that capi-
tal defendants receive the names
and addresses of jury veniremen in
advance creates a serious anomaly
that cries out for reassessment of the
costs and benefits of allowing juror
anonymity. The use of anonymous
juries should be suspended or care-
fully circumscribed until safeguards
are devised to prevent these undesir-
able effects. CJ
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